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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal of a criminal sentence, we again address 
the heartland of cases covered by U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1 
(Laundering of Monetary Instruments). 
 
David G. Bockius pled guilty to wire fraud, foreign 
transportation of stolen funds, money laundering and 
forfeiture. Citing United States v. Smith, 186 F.3d 290 (3d 
Cir. 1999), the District Court declined to sentence Bockius 
under the money laundering guideline U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1 
because it believed the S 2S1.1 heartland includes only 
money laundering associated with extensive drug trafficking 
and serious crime. The government appeals, contending the 
District Court misinterpreted Smith and adopted too narrow 
a view of the heartland. Because Smith made clear the 
heartland includes typical money laundering as well as the 
money laundering activities connected with extensive drug 
trafficking and serious crime, we will vacate the sentence 
and remand. 
 
I 
 
The facts are undisputed. Bockius was the president and 
one of four principals of Asset Protection Management, an 
insurance brokerage firm in Blue Bell, Pennsylvania, when, 
in the summer of 1995, he stole $600,000 from the 
brokerage and its clients and fled to the Cayman Islands.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The exact amount is unclear. Bockius' Pre-Sentence Report states "the 
total amount of money taken is this case is approximately $751,444.31." 
P 13. At his original sentencing, the government contended the actual 
loss was $800,000. The District Court sentenced him to pay restitution 
of $581,500. Because the transactions described in record show that 
Bockius took $600,500 from the Asset Protection Management account, 
we will use the figure of $600,000 as an approximation of the "proceeds." 
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Asset Protection Management sold insurance to business 
clients. After collecting its clients' insurance premiums, it 
deposited them in an escrow, or "premium," account for 
payment to the insurance carriers. Most of Asset Protection 
Management's clients pay most of their premiums at the 
end of July. 
 
On July 31 and August 2, 1995, Bockius wired $220,500 
from the Asset Protection Management escrow "premium" 
account in Pennsylvania to his personal account at 
PaineWebber in New York. He then wired those funds to 
gambling casinos in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Bockius 
traveled to Atlantic City, lost some of the money gambling, 
and carried the rest of the cash back to Pennsylvania. On 
August 10, 1995, Bockius withdrew $380,000 in cash from 
the Asset Protection Management escrow "premium" 
account. 
 
The next day, traveling under the name Louis Middleton, 
Bockius flew to the Cayman Islands with more than 
$500,000 in cash stashed in secret compartments in his 
suit cases. There, he formed a corporation called Little 
Mermaid Holdings and bought a house in the name of the 
corporation with part of the cash. Bockius intended to 
deposit the rest of the funds in Canadian banks in the 
Cayman Islands in deposits less than $10,000 to avoid 
reporting requirements, but asserts instead he formed a 
partnership with Claudio Helvester who soon stole the rest 
of his money.2 
 
Asset Protection Management filed for bankruptcy. None 
of the money has been recovered. 
 
Never far ahead of the authorities, but ostensibly willing 
to cooperate, Bockius turned himself in to the F.B.I. On 
July 16, 1997, Bockius pled guilty to three substantive 
charges: wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1343; 
transporting the proceeds of fraud and theft between the 
United States and the Cayman Islands, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 2314; and money laundering, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 1956(a)(2)(B).3 He conceded the stolen money was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Helvester's role is not undisputed. 
3. 18 U.S.C. S 1956(a)(2)(B) provides 
 
       Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to 
 
                                3 
  
subject to forfeiture as a result of his money laundering 
under 18 U.S.C. S 982(a) and (b)(1). 
 
The Pre-Sentence Report calculated Bockius' sentence 
using the money laundering guideline U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1. At 
 
his sentencing on March 25, 1998, Bockius objected that 
his behavior fell outside the heartland of S 2S1.1. Denying 
his motion for a downward departure, the District Court 
sentenced Bockius to 48 months incarceration followed by 
four years supervised release, restitution of $581,500, and 
 
a special assessment in the amount of $150. 
 
No appeal was filed but, on September 24, 1998, having 
retained new counsel, Bockius filed a petition for habeas 
 
corpus under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 alleging, among other 
things, ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file an 
appeal on the heartland issue. See United States v. Bockius, 
No. 98-CV-5130 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 1999). On the 
recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, Bockius was 
resentenced on November 8, 1999. 
 
At resentencing, the District Court held, under Smith, 
that Bockius' actions fell outside the heartland of the 
money laundering guideline and declined to sentence him 
under S 2S1.1. Employing the fraud guideline instead, the 
court sentenced Bockius to 36 months incarceration. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       transport, transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or funds 
       from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the 
       United States or to a place in the United States from or through a 
       place outside the United States . . . (B) knowing that the monetary 
       instrument or funds involved in the transportation, transmission, 
or 
       transfer represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity 
       and knowing that such transportation, transmission, or transfer is 
       designed in whole or in part -- 
 
       (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, 
the 
       ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful 
       activity; or 
 
       (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or 
       Federal law, [commits a criminal offense.] 
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Contending the money laundering guideline is appropriate, 
the government appeals.4 
 
II 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2255. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.SS 1291 and 
2253. The government was not required to seek a certificate 
of appealability in bringing its appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 
22(b)(3); Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 512 n.15 (3d 
Cir. 1998). We review the District Court's legal conclusions 
de novo. See United States v. Thomas, 221 F.3d 430, 433- 
34 (3d Cir. 2000). Application of the guidelines is a 
question of law reviewed under a plenary standard. See 
Smith, 186 F.3d at 297. 
 
III 
 
After hearing argument on the heartland issue, the 
District Court held: 
 
        [Smith's] instruction to the district court . . . is best 
       capsulized in page 10, next to the last paragraph there. 
       It says and I quote from the opinion: 
 
        "To use the money laundering guideline in this 
       routine fraud case would let the tail wag the dog. Strict 
       focus on the technicalities of the sentencing process 
       obscures the over-arching directive to match the 
       guidelines to the offense conduct which formed the 
       basis of the underlying conviction." 
 
        And they [the Third Circuit Court of Appeals] go on 
       to say: 
 
        "We are convinced that this case presents one of 
       those anomalies that Congress intended the courts to 
       deal with fairly. To fulfill this obligation--that 
       obligation--we direct the use of the fraud guideline, 
       rather than that for money laundering. Ultimately, we 
       conclude that the sentencing Commission itself, has 
       indicated that the heartland of the United States 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The court's decision to resentence Bockius has not been challenged. 
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       Sentencing Guideline Section 2S1.1, is the money- 
       laundering activity connected with extensive drug 
       trafficking and serious crime." 
 
        And in that case of Smith, I conclude here, that that 
       is not the type of conduct implicated here. 
 
Tr. of Sentencing, App. 66-67 (quoting Smith, 186 F.3d at 
300). 
 
The government argues, and Bockius does not dispute, 
that the District Court declined to apply S 2S1.1 because it 
found that Bockius' conduct did not involve drug trafficking 
or serious crime. The government presents three arguments 
for the application of S 2S1.1 in this case: (1) under Smith, 
the heartland of S 2S1.1 includes typical money laundering; 
(2) Smith applies only to "atypical cases" and this is not an 
"atypical" case of money laundering; and (3) Bockius' 
international transportation of one half million dollars of 
embezzled funds is a serious crime. 
 
Because we agree with the government's first argument, 
we need not reach its other two. The District Court read 
Smith to create a narrower heartland than warranted. Smith 
clearly contemplates applying S 2S1.1 to typical money 
laundering as well as to those activities "connected with 
extensive drug trafficking and serious crime." 5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. S 2S1.1. Laundering of Monetary Instruments 
 
       (a) Base Offense Level: 
 
       (1) 23, if convicted under 18 U.S.C. SS 1956(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A), 
or 
       (a)(3)(A); 
       (2) 20, otherwise. 
 
       (b) Specific Offense Characteristics 
 
       (1) If the defendant knew or believed that the funds were the 
       proceeds of an unlawful activity involving the manufacture, 
       importation, or distribution of narcotics or other controlled 
       substances, increase by 3 levels. 
 
       (2) If the value of the funds exceeded $100,000, increase the 
       offense level as follows . . . . 
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A 
 
Money Laundering is a criminal offense under 18 U.S.C. 
SS 1956 and 1957. 
 
       Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a 
       financial transaction represents the proceeds of some 
       form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to 
       conduct such a financial transaction which in fact 
       involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . . 
       knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in 
       part . . . to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, 
       the source, the ownership, or the control of the 
       proceeds of specified unlawful activity, [violates 
       S 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)]. 
 
Subsections (a)(2)(B), and (a)(3)(B) similarly forbid 
transactions aimed at concealing or disguising proceeds. 
Subsections 1956(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A) and (a)(3)(A) prohibit 
promoting criminal activities. 
 
Congress passed sections 1956 and 1957 as part of the 
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 
100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.SS 1956, 
1957), "to `fill the gap in the criminal law with respect to 
the post-crime hiding of ill-gotten gains.' " United States v. 
LeBlanc, 24 F.3d 340, 346 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting United 
States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 569 (10th Cir. 1992). 
Undoubtedly, Congress was intent on combating organized 
crime.6 But that was not the sole purpose of the statute.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See, e.g., 132 Cong. Rec. S9626-04 (Senator Thurman stating 
"[c]reation of a money laundering offense is imperative if our law 
enforcement agencies are to be effective against the organized criminal 
groups which reap profits" through money laundering); id. (Senator 
DeConcini stating "[w]ithout the means to launder money . . . organized 
crime could not flourish as it does now"). 
 
7. Senator DeConcini went on to observe "Money laundering techniques 
are used by large legitimate businesses as well. The President's 
commission discovered that American corporations, such as Gulf Oil, 
Lockheed Aircraft, and McDonnell Douglas, have engaged in illegal 
money laundering. Each corporation was involved in schemes to make 
illegal payments to foreign government officials in order to win lucrative 
overseas contracts. The broad array of groups participating in money 
laundering illustrates how widespread the problem has become." Id. 
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By its text, S 1956 covers a broad array of behavior. 
Initiating, concluding or participating in the disposition of 
funds with the intent of concealing or disguising the nature 
of the funds or of promoting criminal activity may subject 
a person to prosecution if the funds are derived from any of 
a wide range of criminal activities. See 18 U.S.C. S 1956(c). 
We have previously noted that Congress intended to punish 
this use of criminally derived proceeds separately from and 
in addition to the criminal conduct which produced them. 
See United States v. Conley, 37 F.3d 970, 980 (3d Cir. 1994).8 
 
In United States v. Smith, we recognized that the 
government's use of the money laundering statutes to 
sustain additional charges in criminal indictments, 
combined with the sentencing guidelines' penalties, created 
the possibility that money laundering could become a"dog- 
wagging tail." See 186 F.3d at 300. In Smith, use of the 
money laundering guideline, U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1, rendered a 
base offense level of twenty while use of the fraud guideline, 
U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, would have rendered a base offense level 
of six. Where the gravamen of the conduct was fraud, we 
stated this disparity obscured "the overarching directive to 
match the guideline to the offense conduct which formed 
the basis of the underlying conviction." Smith, 186 F.3d at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We have held that S 1956's prohibition on laundering proceeds 
obtained from a criminal offense applies only to funds from completed 
offenses, or completed phases of ongoing offenses. See Conley, 37 F.3d 
at 980. We have also held that crime is not "promoted" by depositing 
criminally derived proceeds in a personal account and using the money 
for personal needs. See id. at 979. When funds become "proceeds" and 
when they are used to "promote" may at times be difficult questions. In 
United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212 (3d Cir. 1993) (cited as 
consistent by Conley, 37 F.3d at 980), we upheld a verdict for violating 
S 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) by cashing checks received through mail fraud. The 
checks were made out to fictitious individuals. Because the violation of 
18 U.S.C. S 1341 was completed when the checks were mailed, we held 
Paramo could reasonably be found to have promoted the antecedent 
fraud by "creating value out of an otherwise unremunerative enterprise." 
Id. at 1218. Therefore, although we have limited the scope of S 1956 to 
the proceeds of completed offenses (or phases of offenses), we have 
construed "promotion" and "completion" broadly. We understand the 
scope of U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1 to be less expansive. 
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300 (quoting United States v. Kuku, 129 F.3d 1435, 1440 
(11th Cir. 1997)). 
 
As noted in Smith, the Sentencing Commission has 
articulated similar concerns. In 1995, the Sentencing 
Commission concluded money-laundering sentences were 
being imposed for a broader scope of offense conduct than 
originally anticipated. See United States Sentencing 
Commission, Report to the Congress: Sentencing Policy for 
Money Laundering Offenses, including Comments on 
Department of Justice Report at 1, 5 (Sept. 18, 1997) 
("Commission Report"). 
 
To address what it saw as sentencing disparities, the 
Sentencing Commission proposed amended "guideline 
penalties for money laundering offenses that were more 
proportionate to both the seriousness of the underlying 
criminal conduct . . . and to the nature and seriousness of 
the conduct itself." Id. at 1. But Congress rejected the 
amendments fearing their adoption would send a message 
"that money laundering associated with drug and other 
serious crimes is not viewed as the grave offense it once 
was." H.R. Rep. No. 104-272, at 14-15 (1995), reprinted in 
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 335, 348-49. Despite rejecting the 
proposed amendments, Congress recognized "the 
application of the current guidelines to receipt-and-deposit 
cases, as well as to certain other cases that do not involve 
aggravated money laundering activity, may be problematic." 
Id. 
 
Although Congress did not define "aggravated money 
laundering activity," the Sentencing Commission has 
described the guidelines' target conduct succinctly: 
 
       1) situations in which the `laundered' funds derived 
       from serious underlying criminal conduct such as a 
       significant drug trafficking operation or organized 
       crime; and, 2) situations in which the financial 
       transaction was separate from the underlying crime 
       and was undertaken to either: a) make it appear that 
       the funds were legitimate, or b) promote additional 
       criminal conduct by reinvesting the proceeds in 
       additional criminal conduct. 
 
Commission Report at 4. 
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Congress also solicited a report from the Department of 
Justice on money laundering enforcement practices. The 
report noted money laundering statutes are not appropriate 
"in cases where the money laundering activity is minimal or 
incidental to the underlying crime," but specifically stated 
the statutes should be used against white collar criminals. 
See Department of Justice Report for the Senate and House 
Judiciary Committees on the Charging and Plea Practices of 
Federal Prosecutors with Respect to the Offense of Money 
Laundering, at 2, 15 (June 17, 1996) (DOJ Report). 
 
The foregoing discussion reinforces the view that, 
although Congress was concerned the guidelines might be 
too severe in punishing defendants who deposit or 
withdraw the proceeds of their crimes in or from banks, 
S 2S1.1 is intended to apply to defendants who knowingly 
conduct financial transactions apart from an underlying 
criminal offense to conceal that the proceeds involved are 
tainted. We held no differently in Smith. 
 
B 
 
Smith held that under Appendix A to the Guidelines 
manual, a sentencing court must engage in a two-step 
inquiry before applying a particular guideline section. 
 
       1. Does the designated guideline apply or is the 
       conduct "atypical" in comparison to that usually 
       punished by the statute of conviction; and 
 
       2. If the conduct is "atypical," which guideline is more 
       appropriate? 
 
Smith, 186 F.3d at 297 (citing United States v. Voss, 956 
F.2d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1992), superseded in part on 
other grounds by amendment to U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1)). 
 
Atypical money laundering conduct is conduct outside 
the heartland of S 2S1.1. See Smith, 186 F.3d at 297-98. 
When deciding whether to apply the guideline, a court must 
undertake a heartland analysis "identical" to that employed 
when evaluating downward departures under U.S.S.G. Ch. 
1, Pt. A, intro. comment. 4(b). Id. at 298. 
 
Because at one point in the opinion Smith recited: 
"[u]ltimately, we conclude that the Sentencing Commission 
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itself has indicated that the heartland of U.S.S.G.S 2S1.1 is 
the money laundering activity connected with extensive 
drug trafficking and serious crime," Bockius contends his 
conduct falls outside the heartland of S 2S1.1. Id. at 300. 
This is a misinterpretation of Smith. 
 
Analyzing the S 2S1.1 heartland, Smith reiterated the 
guideline targets set forth by the Sentencing Commission. 
Id. at 298. Smith also discussed the DOJ report, the 
proposed amendments and Congress's rejection of those 
amendments. See id. at 299. Smith makes clear that a 
court's S 2S1.1 heartland analysis should address whether 
defendants engaged in money laundering in which"the 
`laundered' funds derived from serious underlying criminal 
conduct such as a significant drug trafficking operation or 
organized crime' " or in typical money laundering in which 
a defendant knowingly conducted a financial transaction to 
conceal tainted funds or funnel them into additional 
criminal conduct. Id. at 298. 
 
Smith concluded the defendants should not have been 
sentenced under S 2S1.1 because neither the source of the 
funds nor the nature of the money laundering brought the 
defendants' conduct within the heartland of that guideline. 
The defendants "left a paper trail, conduct inconsistent with 
planned concealment"; the "money laundering activity . . . 
was an `incidental by-product' of the kickback scheme" and 
"Smith's disingenuous efforts towards a cover-up[fell] far 
short of the large scale drug money laundering or serious 
crime contemplated by the Sentencing Commission." Id. at 
300. 
 
Other Courts of Appeals have drawn similar distinctions 
-- establishing the heartland of the money laundering 
guidelines is narrower than the inclusive scope of the 
money laundering statutes but declining to limit the 
guidelines' scope to drug trafficking and organized crime.9 
See United States v. Ross, 210 F.3d 916, 928 (8th Cir. 
2000) (reversing departure but allowing that on remand, 
"court may find Ross' case presents additional unique or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. But see United States v. Adams, 74 F.3d 1093, 1101 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(where defendants found guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. S 1956, U.S.S.G. 
S 2S1.1 must be applied). 
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atypical features that take it outside the money laundering 
guideline heartland similar to those in [Smith]"); United 
States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 768 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(application of S 2S1.1 proper where defendants attempted 
to conceal proceeds of wire fraud); United States v. Ford, 
184 F.3d 566, 587-88 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirming refusal to 
depart from U.S.S.G. S 2S1.2 but noting other courts had 
affirmed departures "based in part on the fact that the 
underlying offenses, though literally within the statute, 
were not drug-trafficking, `organized crime',`serious money- 
laundering', or `unusually severe fraud,' " and implying 
departure might be appropriate where money laundering 
created no additional societal harm); United States v. 
Woods, 159 F.3d 1132, 1136 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming 
heartland departure from S 2S1.2 because depositing funds 
in a personal account and obtaining cashier's checks to pay 
personal bills did not constitute "serious money-laundering 
conduct"); United States v. Hemmingson, 157 F.3d 347, 363 
(5th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging S 2S1.1 may be applicable 
outside of organized crime and drug trafficking but 
affirming heartland departure because "defendants were 
not seeking to legitimize a stream of illegal income into the 
mainstream economy [nor to launder] . . . drug proceeds, or 
proceeds from some other unlawful activity."); United States 
v. Skinner, 946 F.2d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding 
district court could depart from the guideline whereS 1956 
violation rested solely on payments by drug dealer to her 
supplier because payments did not "conceal a serious 
crime" and promotion of the sale was de minimus (as the 
transaction represented only completion of the sale)); see 
also United States v. Caba, 911 F. Supp. 630, 636 (E.D.N.Y. 
1996), aff 'd, 104 F.3d 354 (table) (if defendant's "actions 
were part of a classic money laundering scheme designed to 
conceal . . . sullied monies, . . . the more punitive money 
laundering guideline would be appropriately used to 
determine punishment," but absent such a finding 
downward departure was required where funds were not 
from drug trafficking). 
 
C 
 
In view of this discussion, we will vacate Bockius' 
sentence and remand for resentencing. After embezzling 
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$600,000, Bockius admitted engaging in several acts to 
conceal the illegal source of the money and his ownership. 
After wiring funds from Asset Protection Management's 
escrow "premium" account to an account in New York, he 
wired them a second time to casinos where he converted 
them into cash. In violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1956(a)(2)(B), he 
secretly carried the cash or proceeds to the Cayman Islands 
where he formed a corporation under a false name, planned 
on depositing the money in bank accounts under different 
names in amounts calculated to avoid reporting 
requirements and bought a house in the name of the Little 
Mermaid corporation. Moreover, he claims the remainder of 
the funds was stolen by a person to whom he planned to 
give his money in an attempt to make it untraceable. These 
actions appear to constitute typical money laundering. 
 
IV 
 
As noted in Smith, on remand the District Court should 
engage in a heartland analysis before applying the money 
laundering guideline. Where money laundering is not 
"minimal or incidental," and is "separate from the 
underlying crime" and intended to "make it appear that the 
funds were legitimate" or to funnel the money into further 
criminal activities, S 2S1.1 is an applicable guideline. The 
guideline may also be applicable if there is evidence that 
the activities which fulfilled the broad statutory 
requirements for money laundering were connected with 
extensive drug trafficking or other serious crime. Although 
the application of the correct guideline is a question of law, 
the District Court may be required to make factualfindings 
to resolve these underlying issues. 
 
V 
 
Here, the District Court found Bockius was not involved 
with extensive drug trafficking nor other serious crime. 
Because the court did not address Bockius' typical money 
laundering, we will vacate the judgment of the District 
Court and remand for resentencing. 
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